We introduce the relationship between incremental cryptography and memory checkers. We present an incremental message authentication scheme based on the XOR MACs which supports insertion, deletion and other single block operations. Our scheme takes only a constant number of pseudorandom function evaluations for each update step and produces smaller authentication codes than the tree scheme presented in BGG95]. Furthermore, it is secure against message substitution attacks, where the adversary is allowed to tamper messages before update steps, making it applicable to virus protection. From this scheme we derive memory checkers for data structures based on lists. Conversely, we use a lower bound for memory checkers to show that so-called message substitution detecting schemes produce signatures or authentication codes with size proportional to the message length.
Introduction
The notion of incremental cryptography has been introduced by Bellare, Goldreich and Goldwasser in BGG94] and re ned by the same authors in BGG95] . Suppose that we are given a block-by-block message M and its cryptographic form , i.e. encryption, signature or authentication code. Let M 0 be a message that is obtained by applying a text modi cation from a set M of modi cations to M. With an incremental scheme supporting the text modi cations M a cryptographic form 0 for M 0 can be produced much faster from and M than it would take to compute it from scratch. Our results. We present the incremental authentication scheme IncXMACC that supports single block insertion and deletion, and therefore other operations like replacement. To update an authentication code for inserting or deleting a single block at a given position, this scheme performs only a constant number of pseudorandom function evaluations. Additionally, insertion can be done without accessing the message and deletion merely needs the corresponding block. Security against Message Substitution Attacks. Our scheme remains secure if an adversary is allowed to alter messages before applying the update algorithm | while the shorter authentication code must be kept on some secure medium. Security against these message substitution attacks implies application to virus protection. To protect a large le stored on some insecure medium against unauthorized alternation, authenticate this le and store the shorter authentication code in some incorruptible memory. Whenever an authorized user modi es the le, we can update the authentication code very fast using the incremental algorithm. Conversely, it is very unlikely that an attacker, e.g. a virus, will be able to produce a forgery even if he tampers the documents before update steps. In this sense, message substitution attacks lie between (total) substitution attacks, where both the message and signature can be tampered before update steps, and basic attacks, where the adversary isn't allowed to alter messages or signatures before updating. Related Work. In BGG94] a hash-and-sign scheme based on an incremental hash function was presented. The signature consists of the hash value h and a signature for h produced by an arbitrary non-incremental signature scheme. To update a signature, increment the hash value and sign this new hash value. Unfortunately, this scheme only supports single block replacement and it is provably not secure against message substitution attacks.
In BGG95] the same authors present the tree scheme supporting single block operations like insertion and deletion (and the more powerful modi cations cut and paste to devide a text into two documents resp. to append a document to another). The tree scheme takes (log n) veri cation and authentication steps for the abovementioned operations, where n is the number of blocks of the document. For the cut modi cation, the tree scheme is much faster than IncXMACC, while our scheme supports the insert, delete and paste modi cations applying a pseudorandom function only a constant number of times. Moreover, our scheme produces considerably smaller authentication codes than the tree scheme, though the authentication code must be kept on a secure medium. In contrast to that, signatures and authentication codes produced by the tree scheme can be stored in the insecure memory. A randomized version of the tree scheme is given in M97]. This scheme hides the fact whether the incremental or non-incremental algorithm has been used to produce a signature.
Our scheme IncXMACC re nes the incremental authentication scheme presented in BGG95], which is also based on the XOR MACs. This scheme has several disadvantages in comparison to our scheme: It doubles the key size by using two pseudorandom functions and it requires many random bits. For an update step the incremental algorithm reads more than the corresponding block and security has only been proven for basic attacks. Memory Checkers. Using IncXMACC, we present a method to obtain memory checkers for lists and similar data structures. Informally, a memory checker for a data structure D veri es that for a given sequence of operations, an implementation of D works correctly for this sequence. If not, the checker outputs some error message. There are two sources of errors: The program implementing the data structure can be buggy or the memory where the elements are stored can be tampered by an adversary, e.g. a virus. Intuitively, incremental schemes that are secure against message substitution attacks seem to provide a suitable method to design such checkers. To do so, keep a signature for the current memory content and update the signature accordingly for an operation for D. Nevertheless, in some settings the checker should be able to update the signature given only the old signature and the element resp. block that for example shall be deleted or inserted, without accessing other parts of the memory content. IncXMACC has this property.
Making the connection between memory checkers and incremental schemes we transfer a lower bound for checkers to incremental schemes. Informally, an incremental scheme is message substitution detecting, if it detects when relevant parts of message have been altered before calling the update algorithm. We give a su cient condition under which an incremental message substitution detecting scheme that is secure against basic attacks, is also secure against message substitution attacks. The lower bound states that the length of a signature produced by a substitution detecting scheme must be very large, roughly proportional to the size of the message.
For a discussion about the di erences between the memory checker setting and the program checking model (which has been introduced by Blum and Kannan in BK89]) resp. the software protection model of Goldreich and Ostrovsky GO96] we refer the reader to BEG + 94]. Exact Security. We follow the paradigm presenting our results in terms of exact security BKR94, BGR95] . Informally, the notion of exact security can be described as follows. Assume that we have an adversary for IncXMACC with running time 1 t that makes at most q signature queries for messages of length at most L and achieves success probability . Then we derive (in a constructive way) a distinguisher D for the underlying function family F with parameters t 0 ; q 0 ; 0 , such that D can distinguish F and the family of all functions with running time t 0 , making at most q 0 oracle queries and achieving advantage at least 0 . Here, t 0 ; q 0 ; 0 are determined by t; q; L; . Outline. In section 2 we review the de nition of incremental schemes from BGG95]. In section 3 we present our incremental message authentication scheme. Section 4 deals with the relationship of incremental schemes and memory checkers.
Incremental Cryptography
We brie y review the de nitions of incremental cryptography. This part is mainly based on BGG95]. See this work for further discussion. In section 2.2 we introduce the notion of message substitution attacks.
Incremental Schemes
Let S = (Gen; Sig; Vf) be an ordinary (i.e. non-incremental) signature or message authentication scheme which allows to sign block messages. That is, on input a security parameter s and a block size b in unary, the Gen algorithm outputs in probabilistic polynomial time a pair of keys (e; d). For simplicity we assume that s and b are recoverable from e or d and that b = poly(s). On input the key d and an admissible message M 2 , where = f0; 1g b , the signer Sig outputs a signature or message authentication code (MAC) in probabilistic polynomial time in s (and b). The polynomial time veri er Vf outputs a bit a where a = 1 stands for \accept" and a = 0 for \reject". A scheme is called complete, if Vf(e; M; Sig(d; M)) = 1 for all keys produced with positive probability by Gen and all admissible messages M. We say that a signature for M is valid, if Vf(e; M; ) = 1. Else it is called invalid.
To every document we associate a name 2 f0; 1g and a counter cnt . For the rest of this paper, we assume that the counter value is bounded above by 2 b and that the document name has length at most b, so that both values can be treated as message blocks, and that all messages M 2 i with 1 i poly(s) are admissible. Let (M 1 ; : : : ; M m ; y) 2 denote the message that is obtained For simplicity, we also write S = (Gen; Sig; IncSig; Vf) for the incremental scheme. Additionally, let S(b; s) denote the incremental scheme with xed parameters b and s.
Security
In this section we review the notion of security for incremental signature and authentication schemes. Basically, an adversary performs an adaptive chosen message attack GMR88]. So far, all values are stored securely by the interactive machine. As done in BGG95], we augment our model by an alter command that takes as arguments a document name , a document D 2 and a signature . For an alter command the interactive machine replaces the document with name by D and the signature by regardless of the current values. The counter value cnt remains unchanged.
The alter command models the following settings: Suppose that the documents and signatures are kept on an insecure medium like a remote host. Then an adversary, e.g. a virus, might change the document before issuing an edit command. If the adversary doesn't use alter commands during his attack, we call it a basic attack. If he tampers only documents but no signatures, we call this a message substitution attack. This corresponds to the case when the possibly short signature is kept on a secure medium. If the adversary changes documents and signatures, it is called a (total) substitution attack.
In substitution attacks, we must associate the signature or authentication code to some document. BGG95] therefore introduce virtual documents. To every document D we de ne the For the rest of this paper, we write (t;q;L; ) forq = (q s ; q i ; q v ) andL = (L s ; L i ; L v ). In some settings, parameters may be irrelevant, for example q v and L v in signature schemes. It this case, it is understood thatq andL abbreviate (q s ; q i ) and (L s ; L i ).
Incremental Message Authentication: IncXMACC
In this section we present the stateful incremental message authentication scheme IncXMACC.
Notations and Definitions
For two strings x; y 2 f0; 1g , let x y be the concatenation of x and y. For x; y 2 f0; 1g n , x y denotes the bitwise exclusive-or of x; y. where the probabilities are taken over the random choice of f 2 F resp. g 2 G and the coin tosses of D. We say that D is a (t; q; )-distinguisher if it makes at most t steps (in a standard RAM model), makes at most q oracle queries and achieves Adv D (F; Map(X; Y )) . We say that the family F is (t; q; )-secure if there exists no (t; q; )-distinguisher.
XOR Schemes
Bellare, Gu erin and Rogaway BGR95] introduced the XOR MAC schemes, a general framework for designing message authentication schemes. Let F be a function family with domain f0; 1g l and range f0; 1g L and let F a be a function in F according to key a. Given a message M = M 1] M n] and some state information, e.g. a counter, an algorithm R outputs probabilistically some seed r. On input r and M, a deterministic algorithm E produces a set Z f0; 1g l . Both algorithms must not dependend on the key a. The message authentication code for M is (r; z), where z = L x2Z F a (x). The veri er knowing the key a works as follows: On input a MAC (r 0 ; z 0 ) and a message M 0 , it runs E with input r 0 and M 0 to obtain a set Z 0 f0; 1g l and accepts i L x2Z 0 F a (x) = z 0 . Security of such schemes can be reduced to the algebraic problem that an associated matrix has full rank. For a set Z f0; 1g l let the characteristic 2 l -bit vector be the vector where the x th entry is 1 i x 2 Z. Assume that the underlying function family is Map(f0; 1g l ; f0; 1g L ). Then the probability that the veri er accepts one of the q v queries for a new message is bounded above by 
The Scheme IncXMACC
The scheme IncXMACC F;b is based on a function family F Map(f0; 1g l ; f0; 1g L ) and has block size b l where l = 1 2 l ? 1. For notational convenience we assume that l is even. It supports the operations insert(M; i; M ) and delete(M; j) for inserting block M at position i resp. deleting the j th block in message M = M 1] M n], where 1 i n+1 and 1 j n. Therefore, the scheme supports other operations like replace(M; i; M ), swap(M; i; j) or move(M; i; j) to replace block i by M , to swap block i and j or to move block i to position j, respectively. We sometimes abbreviate delete(M; j) by delete(j) if the corresponding message M is clear from the context. Similar for the other operations. We will rst discuss the single document setting and then show how to proceed in the multi document case. In the single document model, the scheme holds two counters dcnt and bcnt, a document counter resp. a block counter, both initialized with 0. For technical reasons, only messages with more than two blocks are allowed. In the multi document setting, only message with more than four blocks are admissible. In both cases, the counter values are bounded above by 2 l . The underlying idea is that we link every message block to a unique block counter value and incorperate the order of the message blocks by chaining the counter values.
We de ne the algorithms Sig Security is proven as in BGR95]. We rst deal with the case F = R = Map(f0; 1g l ; f0; 1g L ) and
show an upper bound for the success probability. A sketch of the proof is given in Appendix A. Hence, D is a (t 0 ; q 0 ; 0 )-distinguisher for F.
We compare IncXMACC and the tree scheme presented in BGG95]. Our scheme is only secure when the MAC is kept on a secure medium, while the tree scheme is secure against total substitution attacks. The tree scheme can be applied with any secure signature or authentication scheme, but deleting or inserting a block takes (logn) evaluations of the ordinary signature scheme, where n is the number of message blocks of the document. Additionally the tree structure must be maintained. Nevertheless, the tree scheme supports the more powerful modi cations paste and cut.
The advantage of our scheme is that it takes only a constant number of function evaluations for insert and delete (below we'll show that this holds also for the paste modi cation), that it merely accesses the corresponding message block in update steps, and that the size of the MAC is considerably smaller. Namely, let s be the output length of the pseudorandom function used by IncXMACC and the output length of the ordinary authentication scheme used in the tree scheme. We now adress the multi document setting. For every document we associate a name 2 f0; 1g b .
Additionaly, we keep a block counter bcnt and a document counter dcnt for each document.
Signing a document is similar to IncXMACC but we use the value 00 hdcnt i l h i l instead of 0 hdcnti l?1 for the source and 00 hdcnt +1i l h i l instead of 0 hdcnt +1i l?1 for the destination. We assume that all arguments for the operations are speci ed by a parameter n. To emphasize this dependence we write D n . We want to design a program C that checks whether an implementation D n of D n works correctly for a sequence of operations for this data structure. We call these operations user or input operations. C lters the interaction between the user and the data structure resp. memory, so that the user can interact with the data structure only via the checker. See gure 1. After having read the next user operation, the program C shall return the output of that operation to the user or BUGGY if an error occurs, e.g. D n returns a di erent value than the expected one. Obviously, the worst case occurs if the user and the memory is totally under control of one adversary. Additionally, the adversary works adaptively, i.e. his next action depends on all previous steps. An execution is divided into rounds. Each round starts with the checker reading the next user operation. Then it performs some local computation and may interact arbitrarily with the data structure. After having nished this computation, the checker shall return the correct answer for the user operation to the user (or \?" if the operation doesn't produce an output) before reading the next operation. The checker shall output BUGGY if the data structure returns a faulty value at some point in the execution. On the other hand, it shall never output BUGGY if no error occurs. Before starting the rst round, the checker might perform a preprocessing, and additionally, after having read the last user operation, it might do some \postprocessing" (and perhaps output BUGGY then).
We use the RAM model to de ne our checker. The space complexity is measured logarithmically, while time complexity can either be uniform or logarithmic. In this work, time will be meassured uniformly. We assume that the adversary's model of computation is a RAM, too, and that both RAM share a su cient large number of registers to exchange information, while every other memory of each machine is private. See GMR89, GO96] for a more formal treatment of interactive machines.
Definition 4.1 (Memory Checker) A (t pre ; t post ; t op ; s; q; J)-memory checker for a data structure D I n is a probabilistic RAM C such that for every execution with at most q user operations, C takes only t pre preprocessing steps, at most t post postprocessing steps and only t op steps to process each user operation. Additionally, C's private memory is bounded above by s bits and the checker uses at most J instances of D n . A (t pre ; t post ; t op ; s; q; J)-memory checker for D I n is called (t; ; )-secure if the following holds for every adversary A running in time t:
Completeness: If the output of D J n is correct for all operations issued by C, then the probability that C returns BUGGY or that not all answers of C for the user operations are correct is at most , where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of C and A. Soundness: If the output of D J n is false for some operation, then C should output BUGGY with probability at least 1 ? .
In most settings we are interested in checkers for which = 0 holds. These checkers are called complete. De nition 4.1 doesn't rule out the trivial solution, that C simply keeps all values in his private memory. This would rather prevent errors and guarantee correct outputs than check the data structure. We are interested in checkers using only a few bits private memory and causing a small overhead. 3 So this trivial solution gives us an upper bound and a starting point to build more e cient solutions. A checker is called an on-line checker i it outputs BUGGY in that round in which an error occurs. Otherwise it is called an o -line checker. A checker is called noninvasive if at the end of each round, the insecure memory contains only values speci ed by the input operations when the checker reads the next operation. Otherwise it is called invasive. In particular, our checker based on IncXMACC is o -line and noninvasive with the additional property that the checker passes only user operations to the implementation.
Designing Checkers via Incremental Schemes
In this section we show how we can derive a memory checker from IncXMACC. We prove that we can check any data structure based on the structure List n , where List n represents a list with elements from f0; 1g n . The initial con guration is empty. List n supports four operations: insert(i; v) to insert element v 2 f0; 1g n at position i, delete(i) to remove the element at position i and return this value to the user, replace(i; v) to replace the i th value by v and return this element, and read(i) to return the i th element to the user.
We can design checkers for other data structures based on List n like stacks and queues. If the checker maintains a counter for the number m of elements currently in the list, the stack resp. queue commands pop, push(v), dequeue and enqueue(v) are equivalent to delete(m), insert(m + 1; v), delete(1) and insert(m + 1; v). If the data structure can be implemented with lists, we can combine the checker's program and the list implementation of the data structure to obtain a method to securely store the data of this structure on an insecure medium. The following notion of a sound scheme will help us to prove stronger security: Informally, a sound scheme is a scheme such that applying IncSig with an invalid signature i for some M i doesn't yield a valid signature for M. Note that the soundness property doesn't guarantee security. It only states that one cannot produce a valid signature form invalid signatures directly.
It may yet be possible to deduce a valid signature from an invalid one. The proof is omitted. One can easily verify that the tree scheme is sound, too. Thus, message substitution detecting schemes can be viewed as on-line checkers. To prove that a detecting scheme which is secure against basic attacks, is also secure against message substitution attacks, we need the following de nition: For simplicity, we have assumed that IncSig's access is predictable from i , , y in time p(maxfn i g).
Extensions to other parameters are straight forward. Clearly, the tree scheme is a message substitution detecting scheme with predictable IncSig-access.
Proposition 4.8 Let S(b; s) = (Gen; Sig; IncSig; Vf) be a (t;q;L; )-detecting M-incremental scheme with p-predictable IncSig-access, which is (t;q;L; )-secure against basic attacks. Then S(b; s) is (t 0 ;q;L; 0 )-secure against message substitution attacks, where t 0 = t ? q i p(L i ) and 0 = + .
Proof (Sketch). Let E be a normal form adversary with parameters t;q;L, which is successful with probability at least in a message substitution attack. From E we construct via black-boxsimulation an adversary A performing a basic attack. to E without quering IncSig. Else A passes the query to IncSig without tampering the messages and returns the signature to E. In this case, the signature does not depend on other (altered or unaltered) blocks and the answer is correct.
As alter commands don't change virtual documents, every virtual document appearing in A's attack appears in E's attack as well. Let Detect be the event, that E isn't successful in an attack for the detection property. Furthermore, let Succ A resp. Succ E be the events that A resp. E performs a successful attack on the signature scheme. We have The proof is omitted. If and are close to 1, we have 1 ? 1 3 and 1, i.e. a signature must have at least n 3tmax bits. Note that this bound holds for all n; t max and .
A Sketch of Proof of Theorem 3.1
We use Theorem 6.1 from BGR95]. We prove that breaking the incremental scheme in a message substitution attack yields a successful attack for a suitable, but \arti cial" non-incremental scheme. First, we describe a non-incremental scheme that allows to produce MAC. Then we show that we can simulate the adversary E for the incremental scheme to obtain an adversary A for the non-incremental scheme. Finally, we show an upper bound for the probability breaking the nonincremental scheme. We describe how we obtain a black-box-simulation of the adversary E for the incremental scheme. The adversary A for the non-incremental scheme works as follows: It holds a counter bcnt 0 initialized with 0 to mimic the block counter of the non-incremenral R algorithm and a bit s 0 initialized with 0 to store whether E has altered the current document or not. One can easily show that if E outputs a document M with more than two blocks which hasn't appeared as a virtual document before, then M hasn't been signed in A's attack. The proof that the success probability for an adversary breaking the non-incremental scheme is bounded above by I is omitted.
B Sketch of Proof of Theorem 4.4
Clearly, the checker runs the incremental scheme IncXMACC to check the correctness. For every instance we'll have a signature for the content. Updating this signature when inserting, deleting, replacing or reading an element will be done with the insert, delete commands for the incremental scheme. To prevent repetition attacks, we prepend every \message" with a time stamp which the checker stores in its local memory, not in the insecure memory. This time stamp is updated before processing insert, delete commands. If no more operations are left, the checker empties the memory in a postprocessing phase: For each initialized instance it deletes the values in the instance using delete commands and checks that the obtained signatures are accepted by Vf. If some signature is not accepted, it outputs BUGGY, otherwise C accepts.
If all operations work correctly, the checker never outputs BUGGY since IncXMACC is complete. Assume that there is a sequence of operations such that the checker is fooled. We design a adversary E for IncXMACC. E works as follows: Let A be the adversary for the checker. Then E rst runs the whole execution simulating C and A by black-box-simulation using the oracle access for the incremental scheme. Moreover, E maintains the correct memory contents and stores all signatures.
Since E has simulated the whole execution rst, he knows the last user operation for which a wrong value has been returned. E builds a message M that consists of the time stamp, the correct memory content (at this point) and replaces the corresponding block with the wrong value. E outputs this message M and the signature for this message as a forgery. As the scheme is sound and the checker doesn't output BUGGY, i.e. the signature for the nal value has been accepted, this signature is valid for M. Virtual documents are only changed by insert and delete commands, therefore all virtual documents are de ned by the correct memory content and the counter values. Since there is some error in M, and the time stamps make every virtual document unique, M hasn't appeared as a virtual document during the execution. Hence, E is successful whenever A is.
